Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation - Journal of Economic Perspectives
Lerner and Nanda argue that venture capital, despite financing seven of the world's eight largest public companies, has three structural limits. First, VC works best for ideas where market uncertainty resolves quickly within a ten year fund life, which is why software dominates while clean energy or materials get starved of capital; Sand Hill data show software returned 24% annually versus 2% for clean-tech. Second, capital is highly concentrated: the top 50 firms, roughly 5% of all VC funds, raised half of all capital from 2014-2018, and their partners are 82% male, drawn overwhelmingly from a handful of elite schools and three metro areas. Third, governance has weakened as founder-friendly terms have replaced the traditionally onerous oversight venture capitalists once demanded.
Why is relevant?
Two of the field's most established scholars use their own credibility to publicly question the venture model rather than celebrate it, which is unusual and lends weight to concerns that founders and LPs often raise privately but rarely see argued in an academic venue. The concrete diversity statistics, 82% male partners concentrated in three metro areas and a handful of elite schools, give policymakers and allocators specific figures to cite when arguing that capital allocation decisions are shaped by a narrow, non-representative group of decision-makers. The historical contrast between Charles River Ventures' diversified 1970s portfolio and its narrow software-only holdings by 2019 makes a case, with a concrete example, for why entire categories of valuable innovation may now go systematically unfunded.

Author
Josh Lerner, Ramana Nanda
Publication date
January 1st, 2020
Difficulty
Advanced
Keywords
- venture capital limitations
- capital concentration
- VC diversity
- corporate governance decline
- mega-funds
- founder-friendly terms
- tough tech
- staged financing
- fund structure
- innovation financing
Last update